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TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY
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COOPERATION
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I
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory differences in the data privacy arena have been a recurring
source of contention in transatlantic trade relations. In the 1990s, the focus was
primarily on differences in the rules governing market actors. Over the past
decade, however, the focus has expanded to include the public sector and the
policies regulating the collection and use of personal data by government
actors, particularly national security agencies. This article surveys the
considerable history of transatlantic relations in the privacy area and the
attempts that have been made to reconcile legal and policy differences in the
interest of trade liberalization and police and national security cooperation. It
then turns to the current dispute over National Security Agency (NSA)
surveillance and discusses the factual and legal underpinnings of the dispute.
The article demonstrates how this latest episode in transatlantic privacy both
underscores longstanding legal differences and reveals fresh ones. The article
concludes with observations regarding the impact of the NSA dispute on
transatlantic privacy relations and on trade relations more broadly speaking.
II
HISTORY OF DATA PRIVACY IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
A. Regulatory Differences and Similarities
In narrating the history of data privacy, the point of departure is generally
taken to be the Code of Fair Information Practices set forth in an expert report
commissioned by the United States Department of Health, Education, and
1
Welfare and published in 1973. To understand the current transatlantic dispute,
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however, it bears taking one step back, to begin with the judgment of the
2
German Constitutional Court in the Microcensus case. In 1969, the Court
found that the personal information collected in large data banks was
constitutionally protected under Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law (human
3
dignity and the free development of personality). That litigation involved a
challenge to the federal census, which the Court ultimately upheld, but only on
4
condition that the information remain anonymous. This early case was
followed, over ten years later, by the celebrated Census Act case in which the
Court recognized a broad “right of informational self-determination
5
(“informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht”). With the right of informational
self-determination, the Court significantly extended its earlier jurisprudence.
The Court recognized that the right of informational self-determination covered
all personal information, and it abandoned the distinction that had been made
in the Microcensus case between private information and information in the
public domain. The Court also stated that the right came into being at the time
of collection—at the moment that the individual was asked to give up the
information—and not simply once it was used or misused by state actors and
other types of data processors.
The extraordinary possibilities of modern information technologies
underpinned this conceptualization of the right of informational selfdetermination. In language reminiscent of a recent report by the United States
6
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the German Court wrote in 1983
that
[t]he [individual’s decisional] authority needs special protection in view of the present
and prospective conditions of automatic data processing. It is particularly endangered
because . . . the technical means of storing highly personalized information about
particular persons today are practically unlimited, and [information] can be retrieved
in a matter of seconds with the aid of automatic data processing, irrespective of
distance. Furthermore, such information can be joined to other data collections—
particularly when constructing integrated information systems—to produce a partial
or virtually complete personality profile, with the person concerned having insufficient
7
means of controlling either its veracity or its use.

1. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYS., RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).
2. Microcensus Case, 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969), translated and reprinted in DONALD P. KOMMERS &
RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY (3d ed. 2012).
2. Id. at 356–58.
4. See generally id.
5. Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE [Federal Constitutional Court] 1, Dec. 15, 1983, translated and
reprinted in DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 408–09 (3d ed. 2012).
6. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014) [hereinafter REPORT
ON USA PATRIOT ACT].
7. Census Act Case, supra note 5, at 409.
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In the Census Act case, the Court also expanded on the test that applies to
all measures that interfere with basic rights, including privacy. Generally
speaking, any interference with one of the rights protected under the Basic Law
must be authorized by parliamentary law, serve a legitimate purpose, and satisfy
the proportionality test, that is, suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto
8
sensu. In the case of the right of informational self-determination, the Court
further specified that the legislative basis for personal data processing must be
clear and precise and that, to satisfy proportionality, there must be
organizational and procedural safeguards capable of preventing infringements
9
of the right.
This constitutional frame has shaped both the jurisprudence of other
constitutional courts—in particular the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)—as well as
positive lawmaking in Germany and at the European level. Both the ECtHR
and the European Court of Justice have recognized that the right to privacy,
guaranteed under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights,
covers personal data and is triggered whenever public or private entities gather
10
information that can be associated with an individual. Both courts use the
same the jurisprudential framework of (1) a basis in law, (2) clearly defined,
legitimate purposes, and (3) proportionality to analyze data-protection
challenges, as will be discussed in connection with NSA surveillance.
In the legislative sphere, the fundamental right to data privacy has shaped
the design of data-protection legislation in most European jurisdictions. Within
Germany, the Court’s first judgment in the Microcensus case provided much of
the impetus for the first federal data-protection law. A small coalition party, the
Free Democratic Party, took on the issue of new technologies and democracy,
and, drawing on the case and the work of a number of prominent legal scholars,
11
pressed for privacy legislation. A government bill was introduced in May 1973,
and after a long series of parliamentary debates, mostly centered on the extent
of private-sector coverage and the design of the enforcement system, a federal
12
law was finally passed in January 1977. That law—together with a series of
8. DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 67 (3d ed. 2012).
9. Census Act Case, supra note 5, at 410–11.
10. See, e.g., Amann v. Switzerland, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 843, 858 (2000). Since the entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the right to privacy is protected under Article 7 of the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the right to personal data protection is recognized specifically under Article 8
of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
11. See, e.g., ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY: REGULATING PERSONAL
DATA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 51–52, 63–69 (2008) (describing the role of Free Democratic Party);
Klaus Flachmann, Kreditwirtschaft und Datenschutz, 26 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS GESAMTE
KREDITWESEN 56 (1973) (noting and criticizing role of legal academics and the theoretical tenor of the
policy debates); Spiros Simitis, Chancen un Gefahren der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung, 16 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 673, 675, (1971) (providing an example of legal scholarship);
Steinmuller/Lutterbeck/Mallmann/Harbort/Kolb/Schneider, Grundfragen des Datenschutze Gutachten
im Auftrag des Bundesmnisteriums des Innern, July 1971 (BT-Drucksache VI/3826) (legal scholarship).
12. COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
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sectoral laws specific to areas such as telecommunications and the police—
served as the constitutionally required legislative act authorizing the
interference with the right to privacy. The law set down the conditions for the
use and sharing of personal information, most of which turned on the
proportionality requirement that the data processor handle the information
only insofar as “necessary” to accomplish the original purpose of the data
13
operation. Further, it established a legal framework for oversight and
14
enforcement.
The Court’s second judgment in the Census Act case also triggered
parliamentary action, resulting in a series of amendments to the federal data15
protection law in 1990. In line with that case, some of the amendments were
designed to extend privacy rights to the entire gamut of data processing
activities: for instance, in the public sector, the collection of personal data—not
16
simply the storage and use of personal data—was regulated for the first time.
Other amendments were designed to improve enforcement of the right: the
17
independence of the Federal Data Protection Commissioner was improved,
18
state authorities acquired new enforcement powers, individuals were expressly
given the right to vindicate their privacy rights in court, and the rules on proving
damages were relaxed for lawsuits brought against both private and public
19
bodies.
Turning to the positive law at the European level, both the Council of
Europe Convention 108 (Convention 108) and the EU Data Protection
Directive were shaped by the rights framework. This is particularly clear in the
20
Directive, proposed in 1990 and adopted in 1995. Although the Directive was
based on the market harmonization competence in the EC Treaty, designed to
facilitate data flows and trade in Europe, it was essentially conceived as a
measure that would improve protection of the fundamental right to privacy
21
throughout Europe. The main proponents of the Directive were national dataprotection officials with a mission to safeguard the right to privacy, and they
ensured that the purpose, structure, and text of the Directive were rooted in the
22
logic of rights. Thus the Directive declared as its object that the “member
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 77–90 (1992); DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA,
AND THE UNITED STATES 22–24 (1989).
13. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], 1977.
14. BDSG, 1977 §§ 17–42; BENNETT, supra note 1212, at 180; FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 25.
15. BDSG, 1990.
16. See id. § 13.
17. See id. § 22(1).
18. See id. § 38(5).
19. See id. § 8.
20. EP and Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
21. See Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of the
European Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 807, 834–44 (2005) [hereinafter
Transgovernmental Networks].
22. See NEWMAN, supra note 11, at 74.
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states shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and
in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal
23
data.” In line with the constitutional law on rights, the Directive serves as the
law that authorizes the interference with the right to privacy implicated by any
collection and use of personal information and, in accordance with the
constitutional duty of clarity and precision, it sets down the exhaustive list of
24
purposes for which such interference is allowed. And it satisfies the
constitutional requirement of proportionality by limiting data processing to that
which is necessary to accomplish the stated purpose and by establishing a set of
25
organizational and procedural guarantees to protect against privacy violations.
Turning to the United States, there it is indeed appropriate to begin the
historical account of data privacy with the Code of Fair Information Practices.
This included a number of principles that remain prominent in contemporary
privacy law: transparency in the use and processing of data; an individual right
of access to and, if appropriate, correction of personal data; the duty (on the
part of data users) to ensure the accuracy of personal data; the obligation to
adopt security measures to prevent fraudulent uses of data; and a limitation on
uses to the purposes for which the personal information was originally
26
collected. The Fair Information Practices were adopted in the U.S. Privacy Act
27
of 1974 and in numerous sector-specific U.S. laws. When, in 1980, a set of dataprotection guidelines was adopted by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, a number of the American legal principles were
28
included. These guidelines, in turn, influenced the negotiations on Convention
29
108. And today, they are reflected in national privacy regulation in Europe,
which give prominence to transparency, access, accuracy, security, and use
limitations.
Even though widespread adoption of Fair Information Practices has
produced significant convergence in this policy area, not only between the
United States and Europe but among jurisdictions globally, the historical
trajectory on the American side of the Atlantic has also followed a distinctive
path that has generated regulatory conflict with Europe and has given rise to a
series of diplomatic efforts to render the two systems compatible. The first
significant difference was and continues to be the absence of
constitutionalization of the policy area. Even though the periodic expert reports
23. EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 20, art. 1.
24. Id. art. 7.
25. See Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European
Regulatory Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 411, 435–41 (2011) [hereinafter
Cooperative Legalism].
26. RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 1, at 33–46.
27. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS 655–60 (2009).
28. See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry
Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 8.
29. See COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 75 (2003).
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that have been commissioned in response to public concern over information
technologies have generally canvassed the constitutional law in the domain of
privacy and have underscored the importance of privacy for liberal values, they
have all stopped short of recognizing that there is, or should be, a constitutional
30
right to data privacy. The failure to reach such a conclusion is understandable
because the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not squarely support such a
31
conclusion. All of the older cases suggest that such a right does not exist, and
even though the most recent decisions of the Court in the area indicate that the
tide might be turning in light of the dramatic developments that have occurred
in digital technologies, there still does not appear to be a solid majority in favor
32
of a constitutional right to data privacy.
The second difference, related to the first, is the more limited safeguards for
privacy in positive law. This is evident across a number of legislative enactments
and, to use the constitutional framework described earlier, takes two primary
forms. First, the substantive limits on collection, use, sharing, and retention of
data that are loosely connected to the proportionality requirement of necessity
33
are generally more relaxed in the United States than in Europe. To grossly
oversimplify, in U.S. law, more information—from the collection phase to the
erasure phase—is generally viewed as better than less information. Therefore,
although U.S. and European law share similar commitments to transparency of
databases, access to and correction of one’s personal data, reliability of personal
information, and digital security, U.S. law contains fewer restrictions on how
much personal data may be collected, how such data may be used, and how long
that data may be kept. Second, in the United States, the enforcement of privacy
law is largely entrusted to private litigants and courts, not administrative
agencies. This is especially true for privacy regulation of the public sector,
which lacks a powerful set of administrative overseers comparable to European
34
data-protection authorities. The importance of courts, as opposed to
administrative agencies, in the U.S. regulatory scheme has undermined public
oversight because of the difficulty of analogizing privacy harms to traditional
torts and the many doctrinal obstacles this has created for litigants seeking
35
redress through the courts.

30. For recent examples, see generally LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (2013) [hereinafter LIBERTY AND SECURITY]; REPORT ON USA
PATRIOT ACT, supra note 6.
31. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
32. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012).
33. See, e.g., FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM ON DATA PROTECTION IN THE
FIELD OF LAW ENFORCEMENT: SAFEGUARDS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FOR EU CITIZENS 36 (2015)
THE
US
LEGAL
SYSTEM],
[hereinafter
BIGNAMI,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519215/IPOL_STU(2015)519215_EN.pdf.
34. Cooperative Legalism, supra note 25, at 419.
35. Francesca Bignami, European versus American Liberty: A Comparative Analysis of
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To illustrate briefly the more limited statutory safeguards for privacy under
U.S law, compare the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 with the Council of Europe’s
Convention 108. The Privacy Act regulates the government’s collection, use,
and disclosure of all types of personal information. It contains the familiar
transparency, access and correction, reliability, and security principles.
However, there are relatively few substantive limits on what can be done with
personal information. Agencies can collect any personal information that is
relevant and necessary to the agency’s legal purposes set down by congressional
36
statute or presidential executive order. The only type of personal information
that requires special justification to be collected is personal data “describing
how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment [right
37
to freedom of expression and freedom of association]” as opposed to the
numerous categories of information considered to be sensitive in Convention
38
108, including racial origin, criminal convictions, and health information.
Although the Privacy Act generally prohibits sharing with other government
agencies without the consent of the individual involved, it makes a broad
exception for “routine uses” disclosed to the public at the time the record
39
system is created. In contrast with the Convention, which says that personal
data shall be “preserved in a form which permits identification of the data
subjects for no longer than is required for the purposes for which those data are
40
stored,” the Privacy Act contains no provision regulating the length of data
retention. Last, in the case of intelligence and law enforcement agencies, most
of these substantive requirements can be avoided if, at the time that legal notice
of the database is given (part of the transparency duty), the agency claims the
41
exemptions available under the Act. On the question of oversight, the Privacy
Act confines enforcement to litigation and the courts: it gives individuals the
right to sue the government for damages and, in some instances, to receive
42
injunctive relief. Government officials may also be criminally prosecuted for
43
certain violations of the Privacy Act. Although the original bill would have
established an independent commission tasked with enforcement, similar to the
model that took root in Europe in the 1970s, it was removed in the end as part
44
of the compromise necessary to pass the Privacy Act.
Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 684–86 (2007) [hereinafter European versus American
Liberty].
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (2012).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7).
38. See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, no. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), art. 6 [hereinafter Convention 108].
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
40. Convention 108, supra note 38, art. 5e.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)–(k).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i).
44. See S. 3148, 93d Cong. (1974) (original version with privacy commission); Privacy Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (version without privacy commission); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 at 119–24 (1976), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-
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The third significant transatlantic difference that emerged early on and that
persists still today is the absence, in the United States, of a comprehensive,
privacy law applicable to the private sector. Like an independent commission,
regulation of the private sector was proposed in the early days of the policy
area: the original version of the Privacy Act would have regulated personal data
45
processing in both the public and private sectors. The Watergate scandal,
however, was fresh in the minds of lawmakers, and the prospect of a
46
government Big Brother was their principal fear. For their part, industry
groups and many privacy experts successfully opposed comprehensive privacy
regulation on the grounds that it was too early to discern which kinds of privacy
47
problems would emerge in the private sector. They also argued that the
diverse circumstances of various economic sectors would be handled best in
tailored, sector-specific statutes rather than in a cross-cutting piece of
48
legislation. Therefore, even though privacy statutes have been enacted to
regulate a wide array of market sectors—banking, telecommunications, health
care, credit reporting, and so on—there is no single omnibus law capable of
capturing the data practices, sectors, and emerging technologies that fall in
49
between the cracks of the individual statutes.
B. Regulatory Conflict and Cooperation
Although many aspects of European and U.S. privacy regulation are being
debated at present and may change in the near future, the deep-seated
differences analyzed in the previous part are unlikely to disappear anytime soon
and are vital to understanding the regulatory conflicts and attempts at
harmonization of the past twenty years. Conflict with the United States has
involved largely the European Union as opposed to individual member states.
When privacy regulation first became a salient issue in transatlantic relations, in
the mid-1990s, attention was mostly focused on the private sector and market
actors. By the mid-2000s, however, U.S. government actors also came under
scrutiny for their use of personal data to screen for suspected security threats as
well as related criminal offenses. The following narrates both sets of disputes
through to the revelations of NSA surveillance in summer 2013.
1. Regulation of the Market: Safe Harbor
The divergent U.S. and EU approaches to privacy regulation first emerged
as a salient problem and a potential threat to transatlantic trade in the mid1990s. Like many of the early national data-protection laws that had preceded
1974.pdf.
45. S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201 (1974).
46. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, supra note 44, at 4, 832, 893.
47. See, e.g., id. at 68.
48. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 19–20 (1974).
49. Examples of sector-specific statutes include the Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95630 (1978), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012), and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
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it, the 1995 EU Directive contained a blocking provision that required national
authorities to prohibit data transfers to jurisdictions without adequate privacy
50
guarantees. In view of the lack of comprehensive marketplace regulation in
the United States, U.S. firms with European operations feared that the U.S.
legal framework would not be considered adequate and that, as a result, data
51
transfers from Europe to the United States would be deemed illegal. In
response, the U.S. Department of Commerce initiated negotiations with the
European Commission and the two sides reached an agreement on “Safe
Harbor” privacy principles that, if adopted by U.S. organizations, would entitle
52
those organizations to a presumption of “adequacy” under the Directive. The
Safe Harbor agreement took effect in 2000, as did the Commission decision
granting those firms that adhered to the Safe Harbor principles an adequacy
53
finding. Under the Safe Harbor agreement, the legal basis for collecting and
using personal information is consent. Consent is assured by giving the
consumer “notice” of personal data practices and by allowing the consumer
“choice” respecting disclosures to third parties and uses of personal data that
are incompatible with the original purpose of data collection. The Safe Harbor
principles, in line with the Fair Information Practices discussed earlier, also
include a right of individual access and correction, data security, limitations on
use and data transfers, and independent dispute settlement as an enforcement
mechanism. Firms that wish to invoke Safe Harbor must incorporate these
principles in their privacy policy, make their privacy policy public and ensure
that it is readily available to consumers, and self-certify their adherence to Safe
54
Harbor on an annual basis with the Department of Commerce. Since firms
hold themselves out as subscribing to the Safe Harbor principles, a violation of
the principles can be sanctioned by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under
its powers to bring enforcement actions against unfair or deceptive acts or
55
practices.
There has been considerable debate over the effectiveness of Safe Harbor,
both as a vehicle for bringing U.S. corporate practices into line with EU law and
as a tool for safeguarding consumer privacy. In the first years after Safe Harbor
came into force, relatively few firms signed up, but today over 3,200 have self56
certified with the Department of Commerce. Although a number of observers
have called into question whether the firms that hold themselves out as

50. EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 20, arts. 25–26.
51. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 69–79 (2000).
52. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed.
Reg. 45666-01 (July 24, 2000).
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the
Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of the EU Citizens and Companies Established in
the EU, at 4, COM (2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Safe Harbor].
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complying actually do so, the FTC has recently begun taking a more proactive
approach to enforcement. The well-publicized settlement orders against
57
Google, Facebook, and Myspace all included Safe Harbor counts.
Additionally, the FTC has brought over a dozen enforcement actions against
firms that claimed Safe Harbor membership but failed to renew their self58
certification with the Department of Commerce.
More broadly, there has been skepticism over whether consent—that is,
notice and choice—operates as an effective device for safeguarding privacy.
This skepticism applies not only to Safe Harbor but to U.S. and EU privacy
59
regulation broadly speaking, which also rely heavily on consent. The privacy
notices, which describe what will be done with personal information, are
unwieldy, incomprehensible, and generally go unread by consumers. Even if
privacy notices were comprehensible and effective disclosure might therefore
exist, consumer choice is significantly limited by the very expansive
interpretation of what uses are “compatible” with the original purposes of data
collection and the difficulty of navigating electronic disclosures to opt out of
those uses and third-party transfers that are “incompatible.” Furthermore,
consumers are generally unable to choose among vendors based on their
privacy practices because of the absence of significant differences in vendor
policies. Overall, therefore, as a mode of policy coordination and regulatory
cooperation in the context of a globalized data economy and multiple legal
jurisdictions, Safe Harbor has proven quite successful. As a device for
protecting consumer privacy, however, it has been less effective. Policy thinking
has evolved considerably since the Safe Harbor agreement was negotiated over
a decade ago and therefore it might very well be necessary to change the
principles contained in Safe Harbor to assure adequate safeguards for privacy.
The Safe Harbor agreement has recently been undone for reasons quite
different from the consumer privacy concerns that originally motivated the
60
agreement. As revealed by Snowden, U.S. Internet companies afford national
security agencies extensive access to the personal information of their clients.
However, the Safe Harbor agreement and the accompanying Commission
adequacy decision are almost entirely focused on market actors and the privacy
safeguards that apply when they handle consumer data. The legal instruments
57. Complaint at 8, MySpace LLC, FTC File No. 102 3058, No. C-4369 (F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2012);
Complaint at 19, Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092 3184, No. C-4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012); Complaint
at 7, Google Inc., FTC File No. 102 3136, No. C-4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011).
58. See orders referenced at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/06/ftc-approvesfinal-orders-settling-charges-us-eu-safe-harbor; and orders referenced in www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-approves-final-orders-us-eu-safe-harbor-cases.
59. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343 (Jane I. Winn ed., 2006); WHITE HOUSE,
CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY
AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 15, 21 (2012) (discussing
guarantees above and beyond notice and choice entailed by the rights of “Respect for Context” and
“Focused Collection”), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 180–82.
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have virtually nothing to say on the law that applies when the U.S. government
seeks access to consumer data and whether that law is adequate from the
perspective of EU law. As a result, as will be discussed at greater length later in
this article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has found that
Safe Harbor can no longer be used as a legal basis for data transfers from the
EU to the U.S.
2. Regulation of Government Actors: PNR and SWIFT
Shortly after 9/11, the EU and the United States became mired in a separate
set of privacy conflicts—U.S. government access to EU airline passenger data
61
and EU financial transactions data. This set of regulatory conflicts, unlike Safe
Harbor, involved the public sector, specifically government agencies with
responsibilities in the field of national security and criminal law. Many of the
same regulatory differences that triggered the earlier dispute over the private
sector were on display in this second round—the different definitions of
permissible personal data processing and the absence, in the United States, of
an independent enforcement agency—but were somewhat more surprising
given the relatively robust nature of public sector regulation in the United
States. As compared to the private sector, there is comprehensive statutory
regulation of government actors—namely, the Privacy Act—and there exists a
constitutional right to privacy against intrusive government surveillance. As
already discussed, however, U.S. constitutional law is largely silent on the right
to data privacy and the guarantees of U.S. statutory law are limited in the area
of national security and law enforcement, a trend that has been exacerbated by
the post-9/11 political climate.
To understand the contours of this second round of regulatory conflict, it is
necessary to first address the jurisdictional issue of how the regulation of police
and national security agencies in the United States came to be part of the EU
agenda. There are two parts to the answer. First, privacy regulation of the
government and the market is interrelated, given that the government is a
major user of personal information collected by private entities. Under the EU
Directive and Safe Harbor, firms may disclose information to public actors,
including law enforcement and national security agencies, if required to do so
62
by law. In the case of European governments, which are subject to a
fundamental right to personal data protection and to omnibus data-protection
laws, the government’s collection of personal data must be based on a clear and
precise legal authority and must respect the proportionality principle. When a
non-European state requests such information from firms operating within its
jurisdiction, and the request is not in line with the guarantees of European dataprotection law, then the privacy safeguards for the data in the foreign
jurisdiction might not be considered “adequate.” In such a case, the data
61. See generally European versus American Liberty, supra note 35, at 668–74.
62. See EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 20, art. 7(c); Safe Harbor, supra note 56,
Annex 1.
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transfer is unlawful under Article 25 of the Directive and European authorities
are empowered to take action to either block such transfers or to negotiate
agreements that establish the appropriate safeguards in the foreign jurisdiction.
The second explanation for the public-sector dimension to the U.S.–EU
regulatory dispute is more straightforward: the powers of the EU have
63
progressively expanded to include police, justice, and immigration. After the
most recent round of treaty amendments contained in the Lisbon Treaty, these
64
areas are squarely within the jurisdiction of the EU institutions.
In response to 9/11, the U.S. government embarked on an aggressive
campaign to collect, pool, and analyze data with possible national security
implications, and one of the casualties of this campaign has been a series of
transatlantic disputes over the personal data of European citizens. The first
involved the passenger name records (PNR) collected by airlines. After 9/11,
the U.S. authorities began requiring that all airline carriers submit the PNR
data for flights to, from, or through the United States. Given the breadth of the
U.S. program—the amount of information involved, the extensive sharing
among government agencies, and the unclear privacy safeguards—a number of
European air carriers approached the European Commission for guidance on
how to satisfy their EU Directive obligation to safeguard the privacy of data
65
transferred to third countries. The significant regulatory differences between
the EU and the United States—this time in the public domain—triggered
lengthy negotiations over an agreement that would satisfy both security and
66
privacy concerns. The two sides finally reached a deal in 2004. There have
been three successive PNR agreements: The original 2004 agreement; its 2007
67
replacement; and the agreement currently in force, from 2012.
Especially on the European side, the adequacy of the privacy safeguards
afforded by the PNR agreements has been and continues to be contested by a
number of institutional actors, including the European Parliament, the
68
European Data Protection Supervisor, and the Article 29 Working Party.
63. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 923–56
(5th ed. 2011).
64. See id. at 24–28.
65. Transgovernmental Networks, supra note 21, at 862.
66. Id. at 864–65.
67. Commission Decision 2004/535, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11; Agreement between the European
Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record
(PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2007 O.J.
(L 204) 18; Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and
Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 2012
O.J. (L 215) 5 [hereinafter 2012 Agreement].
68. See, e.g., Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 5/2007 on the Follow-up Agreement between the
European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name
Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security Concluded in
July 2007 (Aug. 17, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2007/wp138_en.pdf; Letter from Article 29 Working Party to Member of the LIBE
Committee of the European Parliament, Brussels, Ref. Ares (2012)15841-06/01/2012; European Data
Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the
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Compared to Safe Harbor, this dispute has festered longer. At least part of this
acrimony can be attributed to post-9/11 politics and the fairly intransigent
stance of successive U.S. administrations on security-related matters.
The terms of cooperation set down under the current EU–U.S. PNR
agreement cover the familiar privacy categories of transparency, individual
access and correction, security, enforcement, and proportionality (which
includes purpose, amount of data collected, sensitive data, retention of data,
69
and data sharing). Before turning to proportionality and enforcement—the
two major points of transatlantic difference reviewed earlier in this article and
the source of most of the conflict in the PNR negotiations—it is worthwhile
mentioning individual access and correction, since it raises issues that have also
become prominent in the NSA surveillance controversy. European
policymakers have long been perplexed by the exclusion of non-U.S. persons,
that is, persons who are not U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, from
coverage under the Privacy Act of 1974. As will be explained below, this
differential treatment of U.S. and EU persons has since come to the fore in the
context of NSA surveillance because it also marks privacy guarantees in the
national security domain. The exclusion of non-U.S. persons from the Privacy
Act is important for the access and correction principle because it prevents
Europeans from exercising access rights under that legislation. The EU–U.S.
agreement, therefore, specifies that the Freedom of Information Act is to be
used to obtain the information contained in the PNR held by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
Returning to proportionality and enforcement, the purposes of PNR data
processing are limited mostly to preventing and prosecuting terrorist offenses
and transnational crimes punishable by imprisonment of three years or more.
Nineteen types of PNR data can be requested, and the transmission from the air
carrier to DHS occurs via a “push” system, meaning that the carrier transmits
70
the required data into DHS’s database. The “push” system is designed to
reduce the risk that irrelevant data will be collected, which can occur when
DHS is authorized to extract the PNR directly from the carrier’s reservation
71
system through what is known as a “pull” system. Sensitive data—in the PNR
Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of
Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 2012/C 35/03 (Sept. 2,
2012).
69. 2012 Agreement, supra note 67. For a general description of the operation of the program, see
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Joint Review of the
Implementation of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland
Security Accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council
on the Joint Review of the Implementation of the Agreement between the European Union and the United
States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States
Department of Homeland Security, COM (2013) 844 final (Nov. 27, 2013).
70. Id. at 14.
71. See, e.g., Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 7/2010 on European Commission’s
Communication on the Global Approach to Transfers of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data to Third
Countries,
at
6
(Nov.
12,
2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
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context, often religious affiliation revealed by meal preferences—can only be
used under exceptional circumstances and are generally deleted after thirty
days. PNR data are retained for fifteen years—five years in an “active”
database and ten years in a “dormant” database—after which time they are
anonymized; if data are used for a specific case or investigation they may be
72
retained as long as necessary. Sharing this data with other domestic
government agencies is allowed only for the counterterrorism and law
enforcement purposes authorized by the agreement and even then, only “in
73
support of those cases under examination or investigation.” Presumably,
therefore, sharing does not occur in bulk, but rather only with reference to
specific individuals or events being investigated. As for enforcement and
oversight, the DHS Privacy Office is tasked with primary responsibility, but the
agreement also mentions other “Department Privacy Officers,” the DHS Office
of Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office, and the United
74
States Congress.
In 2006, the second major dispute over privacy regulation of government
actors emerged, this time over access to and use of financial data. Since 9/11, the
United States Treasury Department, under a program known as the Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), had been collecting vast quantities of
financial data on bank transfers and other types of operations from the Belgian
private entity the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
75
Telecommunications
(SWIFT).
SWIFT
is
the
largest
financial
telecommunications network in the world and is the system used to execute and
record most interbank transactions. Although it is established in Belgium, it had
two operational servers, one in the Netherlands and a mirror server in the
United States. Because of its presence in the United States, SWIFT was subject
to the administrative subpoena power of the Department of Treasury, which is
authorized to request financial information for counterterrorism purposes. But
because SWIFT is established in Belgium and the vast majority of the data in
the U.S. mirror server originated in the EU, SWIFT was also clearly subject to
European privacy law and the duty under that law to ensure that privacy would
be respected upon the transfer of that data to third countries. In fact, from the
beginning, SWIFT knew that it was running the risk of violating European
privacy law. Because it was prohibited under the terms of the administrative
subpoena from disclosing the data transfers, SWIFT requested and received a
“comfort letter” from the Department of Treasury in which the Department
pledged to support SWIFT in the event that it was later sued by foreign
governments or third parties.

29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2010/wp178_en.pdf.
72. 2012 Agreement, supra note 67, at 8 (art. 8).
73. Id. at 10 (art. 16).
74. Id. at 10 (art. 14).
75. For an account of the initial stages of the TFTP dispute, see European versus American
Liberty, supra note 35, at 672–74.
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When the TFTP was revealed in 2006, the European Parliament and
European data-protection authorities strongly condemned the U.S. government
for secretly and indiscriminately collecting the private financial records of
millions of Europeans. Both the Belgian data-protection authority and the
Article 29 Working Party found that SWIFT had violated European privacy
76
law. The European Commission and the U.S. Department of Treasury
subsequently entered into discussions to assuage European privacy concerns.
The result was a number of Treasury representations laying out the scope of the
privacy guarantees built into the TFTP and an agreement allowing an “eminent
European person” appointed by the Commission to conduct periodic reviews to
77
ensure that Treasury had complied with its representations. Although this
oversight system did indeed result in two largely favorable reports to the
78
Commission by the French magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière, it was soon taken
over by events: SWIFT announced in 2007 that it planned to establish a new
operating center in Switzerland by 2009 so that intra-European bank messages
79
could be stored exclusively in Europe. It therefore became urgent for the U.S.
government to reach a deal with the EU to assure continued access to
European financial transaction data once those data were physically removed
from the United States and were therefore no longer subject to the U.S.
administrative subpoena power. The first agreement, signed in 2009, was voted
down by the European Parliament largely in reaction to what was perceived as
a move by the Council and Commission to circumvent the Parliament’s new
powers in the areas of police and judicial cooperation and external relations
80
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The second EU–U.S.
agreement (TFTP II), signed and ratified in summer 2010, is the agreement

76. Belgian Data Protection Commission, Opinion No. 37/2006 of 27 Sept. 2006 on the Transfer of
Personal Data by the CSLF SWIFT by Virtue of UST (OFAC) Subpoenas, at 26–27,
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2644.pdf; Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 10/2006 on the
Processing of Personal Data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT) (Nov. 22, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2006/wp128_en.pdf.
77. Notice: Publication of U.S./EU Exchange of Letters and Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
Representations of the United States Department of the Treasury, 72 Fed. Reg. 60054-02 (Oct. 23,
2007).
78. Commission Report on the Joint Review of the Implementation of the Agreement between the
European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program (Mar. 13, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/commissionreport-on-the-joint-review-of-the-tftp.pdf; Report on the Second Joint Review of the Implementation of
the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and
Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of
the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (Dec. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Report on Implementation of
Agreement], http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/pdf/20121214_joint_review_report_tftp_en.pdf.
79. Andre R. Jaglom, Internet Distribution, E-Commerce and Other Computer Related Issues:
Current Developments in Liability On-Line, Business Methods Patents and Software Distribution,
Licensing and Copyright Protection Questions, SW041 ALI-CLE 687, 668–69 (2015).
80. European Parliament Press Release, SWIFT: European Parliament Votes Down Agreement
with the US (Nov. 2, 2010).
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currently in force.
Similar to the PNR agreement, the privacy guarantees in TFTP II can be
grouped into transparency; individual access and correction; security;
enforcement; and proportionality, which includes purpose, amount of data
collected, sensitive data, retention of data, and data sharing. The procedure
outlined under the agreement requires that the Treasury issue requests for
data—generally categories of data—that are “necessary” for purposes of
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist
financing and that are “tailored as narrowly as possible to minimise the amount
82
of data requested.” Such requests are issued to SWIFT and to Europol, which
must review the request for compliance with proportionality before SWIFT can
83
release the data. Once the Treasury receives the data, it may only conduct
individualized searches—not data mining—and only when it suspects that the
84
subject in question has a “nexus to terrorism or its financing.” Although the
agreement recognizes a category of “sensitive data,” it anticipates that the
financial transaction data will rarely, if ever, implicate sensitive data; most likely
for this reason, the agreement does not specify the special precautions that
85
would be taken in the unlikely event that sensitive data were generated.
Retention periods differ for “extracted” and “non-extracted” data—nonextracted data are to be deleted after five years, whereas extracted data can be
retained for as long as necessary for the specific investigation or prosecution for
86
which they are used. The information extracted in individualized searches may
be shared with other law enforcement and national security agencies “for lead
purpose only and for the exclusive purpose of the investigation, detection,
87
prevention, or prosecution of terrorism or its financing.” Similar to PNR,
oversight is entrusted primarily to the Privacy Office, this time in the Treasury
Department.
Even more so than the PNR agreement, TFTP II has failed to allay
European privacy concerns and has been the object of repeated criticism by
88
parliamentarians and European data-protection authorities. This can be
explained by virtue of the sheer volume of personal data entailed and the
secretive nature of the program. Whereas passenger name records are relatively
81. Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing
and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the
Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 5 [hereinafter 2010 Agreement].
82. Id. at 8 (art. 4.2(c)).
83. Id. at 8 (art. 4.4).
84. Id. at 9 (art. 5.6).
85. Id. at 9 (art. 5.7).
86. Id. at 9 (art. 6).
87. Id. at 9 (art. 7).
88. See, e.g., Letter from Article 29 Working Party to Melissa A. Hartmen, Deputy Assistance
Secretary, Privacy, Transparency and Records, U.S. Department of the Treasury (June 7, 2011);
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, European Parliament, Minutes from Meeting
of 3 October 2011, from 15.00 to 18.30, and 4 October 2011, from 09.00 to 12.30 and from 15.00 to 18.30,
LIBE_PV(2011) 1003_1.
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discrete data points, linked to a specific person and flight, the requests made
under TFTP II are drawn broadly so as to capture possible terrorist financing.
Moreover, whereas individuals may experience fairly immediate consequences
from PNR—for instance, repeated secondary screening on entry in the United
States, which may give rise to the access, correction, and oversight procedures
outlined in the agreement—the financial data used in TFTP will generally only
trigger visible government action when the individual is apprehended or
prosecuted, making those provisions largely theoretical. Finally, transparency is
particularly challenging in the TFTP context: the Treasury has argued that the
effectiveness of the program would be undermined by the disclosure of the
terms used to extract the data or the number of investigations supported by the
89
financial data.
To conclude this discussion, it is important to note one element of
transatlantic privacy conflicts in the public sector that sets them off from
conflicts involving market regulation. As Henry Farrell and Abe Newman have
argued, the U.S.–EU disputes over PNR and TFTP have not only set the EU
against the United States but have exposed divisions between institutional
90
actors within the EU. Ministries of Home Affairs, represented on the Council,
and representatives of the more conservative political groups in the European
Parliament, such as the European People’s Party, have generally been more
favorable to sharing data with the United States than data-protection
authorities and liberal and left-leaning parliamentarians. Moreover, these prosecurity actors have used U.S.–EU negotiations over PNR and TFTP to
leverage more extensive powers for their own police and intelligence agencies:
both PNR and TFTP II include provisions on reciprocity that require the U.S.
authorities to share the data generated by the PNR and TFTP programs with
91
their European counterparts. Furthermore, PNR and TFTP II have served as a
92
springboard for similar intra-European data-sharing programs. These
transatlantic disputes, therefore, both have exposed the conflicting positions of
privacy and security advocates within the EU and have offered an opportunity
for pro-security actors to enhance the EU’s law enforcement and national
security capabilities.

89. See, e.g., Report on Implementation of Agreement, supra note 78, at 5.
90. See Henry Farrell & Abraham Newman, The New Politics of Interdependence: Cross-National
Layering in Trans-Atlantic Regulatory Disputes, 48 COMP. POL. STUD. 1, 10–15 (2014); Abraham
Newman, Transatlantic Flight Fights: Multi-level Governance, Actor Entrepreneurship and International
Anti-terrorism Cooperation, 18 REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 481 (2011).
91. 2012 Agreement, supra note 67, at 11 (art. 20); 2010 Agreement, supra note 81, at 10 (arts. 10–
11).
92. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Use of
the Passenger Name Record Data for the Prevention, Detection, Investigation and Prosecution of
Terrorist Offences and Serious Crime, COM (2011) 32 final (Feb. 2, 2011).
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III
NSA SURVEILLANCE
The latest chapter in the history of transatlantic disputes over data privacy
began in 2013 with the Edward Snowden leaks of massive NSA surveillance. As
with PNR and SWIFT, the EU–U.S. controversy concerns the activities of
government agencies responsible for national security, but the immense scale of
the NSA programs makes the other two seem fairly inconsequential by
comparison. More than the previous episodes, the NSA’s activities have
exposed rifts not only between the two sides of the Atlantic, but also within
Europe, between security agencies and privacy institutions and between the
actual practice of state security and the formal legal requirements and
fundamental rights that are supposedly applicable against all state actors. As
the European public learned from the Snowden leaks, the NSA has been
routinely assisted by its counterparts in the United Kingdom, France, and other
European countries even though many of the surveillance programs squarely
implicate the European right to personal data protection. This part considers
the implications of the NSA disclosure both for transatlantic relations and for
the future evolution of EU privacy regulation.
A. European Perspectives on the Snowden Leaks
Much is unknown about the programs of mass surveillance carried out by
the NSA and its European counterparts in the last decade. Western
governments have frequently resorted to the state secrecy doctrine to maintain
93
a veil of ignorance over the general features of intelligence programs.
However, as a result of the Snowden leaks and the official and unofficial
disclosures that ensued, a series of basic facts have been clarified and can be
94
assumed uncontroversial. Although the leaks concerned a truly spectacular
array of surveillance activities, attention has focused on two in particular: One
program, conducted under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which collects the call
95
records of virtually every American; and another, conducted under Section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is targeted at foreigners

93. Interestingly, whereas the U.S. government has declassified many documents following the
Datagate, European governments so far have not taken similar steps.
94. See CASPAR BOWDEN, EUR. PARLIAMENT POL’Y DEPT., CITIZENS’ RTS. & CONST. AFF.,
THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMMES AND THEIR IMPACT ON EU CITIZENS' FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_
/briefingnote_en.pdf.
95. See generally PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014) [hereinafter REPORT
ON
TELEPHONE
RECORDS
PROGRAM],
https://www.pclob.gov/library/215Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf. For a detailed analysis, see Laura K. Donohue,
Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
757, 770–76 (2014); David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POL’Y 209 (2014).
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and has as a result been the main focus of European criticism.
Under Section 702, the U.S. government is authorized to target for
surveillance “non-US persons,” that is, not U.S. citizens or permanent residents,
who are “reasonably believed to be located outside the United States,” in order
97
“to acquire foreign intelligence information.” Unlike traditional foreign
intelligence surveillance, the U.S. government need only certify the believed
identity and location of the target; it is not required to show probable cause that
98
the person is a lone-wolf terrorist or an agent of a foreign power. The NSA
uses Section 702 to engage in two main types of electronic surveillance and bulk
data collection. First, with PRISM collection, the government obtains content
and metadata from Internet companies related to a “selector,” such as an e-mail
99
address. The kind of information varies by provider and can include e-mails,
videos, social networking details, and more. Second, with “upstream
collection,” the government compels the assistance of the providers that control
the telecommunications backbone over which communications transmit.
Through this device, the government intercepts communications directly, again
100
based on a “selector.” Upstream collection, unlike PRISM, can include the
content of telephone conversations. In addition to these and similar programs,
information has recently surfaced that the NSA, independently or in
cooperation with foreign services, mainly the United Kingdom Government
Communications Headquarters, has engaged in surveillance of EU institutions,
101
member state embassies, and foreign leaders. One example is the muchdiscussed interception of Chancellor Merkel’s telephone communications.
Civil society actors, journalists, human rights nongovernmental
organizations, ordinary citizens, and others were outraged to learn of the scale
and nature of the surveillance programs. In contrast, the reaction of European
governments was mixed. On one hand, they repeatedly voiced their strong
objections to the U.S. authorities, as in the case of the alleged wiretapping of
102
Chancellor Merkel’s telephone; on the other hand, they failed to address
head-on the leaked information that implicated European intelligence

96. See generally PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014) [hereinafter REPORT ON SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE],
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf.
97. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
98. BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 25.
99. See REPORT ON SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE, supra note 96, at 7.
100. Id.
101. See Dieter Deiseroth, Nachrichtendienstliche Überwachung durch US-Stellen in Deutschland –
Rechtspolitischer Handlungsbedarf?, 2013 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 194; DIDIER BIGO ET
AL., NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONAL DATA IN EU MEMBER STATES
AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH EU LAW 7 (2013) [hereinafter NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS
SURVEILLANCE],
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493032/IPOLLIBE_ET(2013)493032_EN.pdf.
102. See generally Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Europäer sind nicht Bürger zweiter Klasse
im Datenschutz, 2013 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 481
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agencies. Indeed, in contrast with the United States, which has openly
admitted the existence of the NSA programs and has confirmed their main
features, the member states have so far failed to give detailed explanations of
their surveillance programs and have maintained the classified status of most of
104
the relevant documents.
The Snowden leaks and the journalistic and parliamentary inquiries that
have been conducted to date unequivocally demonstrate that several European
intelligence agencies have actively participated in the implementation of the
NSA programs and have themselves collected a vast amount of data and
information subsequently made available, generally on the basis of reciprocity,
105
to their foreign counterparts.
In particular, the United Kingdom has
cooperated closely with the NSA, setting up an extremely powerful system of
106
large-scale surveillance. According to some allegations, it seems also that the
Governmental Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) infiltrated the Belgian
107
communication provider Belgacom to collect data on European institutions.
Such activities are not to be explained only on the basis of the long-lasting
U.K.–U.S. relationship in the field of intelligence—a relationship that is also
backed by a substantial financial contribution from the Unites States to
108
GCHQ. Instead, there is sufficient evidence that the agencies of other
European countries, such as Germany, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands,
have carried out similar mass-surveillance programs. Among such programs are
the direct control of communications nodes known as “upstreaming,”
109
systematic access to private-sector data, and the use of decryption software.
The scale and technological sophistication of these programs are probably
not comparable to the U.S. surveillance programs. There is no doubt, however,
that mass surveillance of communications has been carried out by European
agencies, and that in most cases a vast amount of personal data—content data
110
and metadata—has been made available to their U.S. counterparts. From a
European perspective, therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that mass
103. NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101, at 9–19.
104. Id.; Stefan Heumann, Die NSA in aller Munde—und was ist mit dem BND?, CARTA (Mar. 3,
2011), http://www.carta.info/66295/die-nsa-in-aller-munde-und-was-ist-mit-dem-bnd/; Working Party,
Working Document on Surveillance of Electronic Communications for Intelligence and National Security
Purposes, at 9 (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Working Document], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp228_en.pdf.
105. For a detailed analysis, see NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note
101, at Annex 1.
106. This program is code-named TEMPORA and consists of the routine interception of submarine
cables, with the aim of gaining knowledge of the content of Internet communications. See id. at 51.
107. Belgacom Attack: Britain's GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecoms Firm, DER SPIEGEL (Sept. 20,
2013),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecomsfirm-a-923406.html.
108. Nick Hopkins & Julian Borger, Exclusive: NSA Pays £100m in Secret Funding for GCHQ, THE
GUARDIAN, (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spyingedward-snowden; see NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101, at 54–55.
109. Id. at 19–26.
110. Working Document, supra note 104, at 9.
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surveillance is by no means a solely U.S. issue. It also raises the question, again
from a European viewpoint, of the legal basis and legitimacy of both the EU
and U.S. surveillance operations, discussed next.
B. The Lawfulness of U.S. Surveillance
The Section 702 program has attracted significant criticism in Europe. As
discussed earlier in the analysis of PNR and TFTP II, there are several different
types of privacy guarantees generally believed to be important under European
law: transparency, individual access and correction, accuracy, security,
oversight, and proportionality. As in the earlier transatlantic privacy disputes,
the European reaction has been partly driven by the argument that these
standards have not been met. It is obviously impossible and undesirable to
ensure complete transparency, individual access and correction, and oversight
in the area of intelligence gathering, but the degree of freedom afforded to
surveillance actors under the Section 702 program has been a source of
puzzlement.
Consider first the European constitutional requirement of a basis in law for
any infringement of the right to personal data protection. Although the current
version of the Section 702 program is conducted, unlike earlier versions,
pursuant to a congressional law that sets down different substantive and
procedural criteria, the type of personal information that may be gathered—
foreign intelligence information involving non-U.S. persons located outside of
111
the United States—is not clearly defined. As noted in the report of the EU
Data Protection Working Party, “foreign intelligence could, on the face of the
provision, include information concerning the political activities of individuals
or groups, or activities of government agencies, where such activity could be of
112
interest to the United States for its foreign policy.” It could also include
113
The U.S. government,
activities relevant to U.S. economic interests.
questioned on the exact scope of the notion, refused to give a detailed answer
on the grounds that this would compromise the efficacy of intelligence
114
activities. Moreover, FISA contains no limitation on the geographical reach of
the surveillance, and it therefore could, in principle, cover not only the
operations of service providers in the United States, but also data stored in the
cloud and data processed by subsidiaries of U.S. companies located in the EU.

111. For a detailed analysis of the history and content of Section 702, see LIBERTY AND SECURITY,
supra note 30, at 130.
112. Report on the Findings by the EU Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc EU–US Working Group on Data
Protection, at 4 (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Report], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf.
113. The President, however, has stated that the collection of foreign commercial information is not
authorized for purposes of affording a commercial advantage to U.S. companies. Office of the Press
Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive—Signals Intelligence Activities, § 1(c), WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2014)
[hereinafter
PPD-28],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policydirective-signals-intelligence-activities.
114. Id.
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Turning to the safeguards afforded by judicial oversight, at first blush they
appear substantial when compared with Europe’s corresponding judicial
safeguards. In many European systems, oversight is conducted by special
parliamentary committees or executive bodies, and does not contemplate a role
for the courts. By contrast, under FISA, a special court comprised of ordinary
judges (the FISA Court) supervises intelligence surveillance. In the context of
Section 702, however, the powers of the FISA Court are relatively limited: it
only approves the type of foreign intelligence information being collected, the
targeting procedures used by the NSA to conclude that surveillance will lead to
the acquisition of foreign intelligence information on a non-U.S. person outside
of the United States, and the minimization procedures used to prevent the
115
collection and use of information on U.S. persons. In contrast with traditional
FISA surveillance, the FISA Court does not review applications for the
116
surveillance of specific individuals. Furthermore, the FISA Court’s orders are
classified and companies that are required to cooperate with the NSA, under
the authority of the orders, are bound to secrecy. As a result, there is no way for
data subjects to be informed that their personal data are being collected or
117
processed. Relatedly, individuals have no right to obtain access, rectification,
or erasure of data, and the prospect of administrative or judicial redress is
virtually nonexistent. The difficulty of obtaining a judicial remedy, absent a
criminal prosecution based on unlawfully acquired evidence, was confirmed in
118
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA. In that case, the Supreme Court found
that the petitioners—human rights lawyers and others who communicated with
clients abroad—did not have standing because the claim that their telephone
119
communications were likely to be intercepted was “too speculative.”
NSA surveillance has also raised proportionality issues familiar from the
previous rounds of transatlantic conflict. One feature of the surveillance
programs that has attracted much attention is the lack of protection for
120
metadata. In the context of the Section 215 call records program, the U.S.
government has confirmed that the NSA collects call metadata from all major
telecommunications companies and maintains a database of all such calls for
121
five years. This is done irrespective of the safeguards formally set forth by the
Fourth Amendment—judicial warrant and probable cause—but consistent with
the interpretation given by the Supreme Court in the 1970s, according to which
115. REPORT ON SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE, supra note 96, at 26–27.
116. See L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security Exception: Its History and
Limits, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1399 (2013).
117. See Report, supra note 112, at 16; Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for
Meaningful Accountability, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 69, 82–84 (2015).
118. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
119. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013).
120. See generally Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power and Secret
Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 9 J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 481 (2014).
121. See Report, supra note 112, at 11; REPORT ON TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM, supra note
95, at 25; Kris, supra, note 95, at 221. The program was amended by Congress in June 2015, but the
retention period was not modified.
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there is no “reasonable expectation of privacy” for personal data entrusted to a
122
third party. As explained at the beginning of this article, the EU takes the
opposite approach: metadata is considered “personal data” and therefore must
be collected and processed according to the general principles of data123
protection law.
Another anomaly with respect to European law is how
privacy principles are applied to bulk collection. The U.S. intelligence
community takes the position that the acquisition of personal data does not
amount, in and of itself, to “processing”; data are processed only at the moment
124
when they are analyzed by a human being. In other words, the default
position in U.S. national security law is that privacy concerns arise only when
the information is accessed by a human being. This view stands in contrast with
European law, under which the right to personal data-protection is triggered at
the moment of collection, and facilitates more extensive bulk collection than is
contemplated under European law.
In addition to these well-known transatlantic differences, the Snowden leaks
have introduced a new bone of contention in transatlantic privacy relations—
the dramatic difference in U.S. law between the treatment of citizens and noncitizens. Even more than PNR and TFTP, the NSA programs have brought into
sharp focus the two-track scheme that runs throughout U.S. privacy law and
125
that results in relatively few guarantees for EU citizens. This is particularly
126
apparent under Section 702. The surveillance authorized under Section 702 is
directed at foreign citizens who are not legal residents and who are believed to
127
be located outside the United States. A corollary of this basic mission is that
most of the limitations contained in Section 702 seek to protect U.S. persons
128
from being swept up in foreign intelligence surveillance. The targeting and
minimization procedures subject to the approval of the FISA Court are aimed
at protecting the privacy of U.S. persons, not foreign citizens. This two-track
scheme also marks U.S. constitutional law. All government surveillance must
respect the privacy guarantees contained in the Fourth Amendment, but the
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
129
nonresident aliens located abroad.
In other words, most of the EU citizens

122. See European versus American Liberty, supra note 35, at 624.
123. See Malone v. U.K., 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 (1984); see also Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland
Ltd. v. Minister for Communc’s, Marine and Natural Res., 2014 E.C.R (2014).
124. See Report, supra note 112, at 9.
125. See generally BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 36.
126. See Konrad Lachmayer & Normann Witzleb, The Challenge to Privacy From Ever-Increasing
State Surveillance: A Comparative Perspective, 37 U.N.S.W. L.J. 748, 764 (2014); LIBERTY AND
SECURITY, supra note 30.
127. See LIBERTY AND SECURITY, supra note 30, at 135.
128. See Christopher Kuner, Foreign Nationals and Privacy Protection: A Comparative
Transatlantic Analysis, in DATA PROTECTION ANNO 2014: HOW TO RESTORE TRUST?:
CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOUR OF PETER HUSTINX, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR
(2004–2014) 213 (Hielke Hijmans & Herke Kranenborg eds., 2014).
129. According to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 265–68 (1990), the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee rights for non-U.S. persons outside the
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implicated by NSA surveillance have no privacy rights under the U.S.
Constitution.
To be fair, many, if not most, countries operate with surveillance laws that
afford heightened privacy protections to their own citizens. For example,
German law authorizes its intelligence services to carry out surveillance only on
telecommunications connections that are not regularly used by German citizens,
130
thereby treating non-Germans less favorably. What is more exceptional is the
denial of any human rights protection for foreigners. Many constitutions and
international treaties—including Article 17 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the United States is party—protect
131
privacy as a human right vested in all persons. Thus the constitutional
jurisprudence of countries like Germany does not draw a categorical difference
between the rights afforded to citizens and foreigners. A number of European
commentators have argued that because the United States permits the virtually
unrestricted surveillance of the communications of foreigners located outside of
132
its territory, it violates its human rights obligations under the ICCPR.
The extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is a controversial
issue and it is not easy to predict how it will be resolved in the field of mass
133
surveillance. On this scope issue, however, as on the substance of privacy
rights, there are significant differences between the United States and Europe.
The United States has traditionally argued that under the ICCPR states are
only responsible for human rights violations on their own territory, not
134
extraterritorially. By contrast, the European approach is somewhat more
United States. Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects the rights of “the people,” that is, “a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that community.” Applying this model, several scholars have
argued that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by the mass-surveillance of foreign
communications carried out by the NSA. See John Yoo, The Legality of National Security Agency’s
Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 901, 919 (2014); Judith Rauhofer &
Caspar Bowden, Protecting Their Own: Fundamental Rights Implications for EU Data Sovereignty in
the Cloud 23–25 (Univ. of Edinburgh Sch. of Law, Research Paper Series No. 2013/28),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2283175 (referencing the personal data of
foreigners stored by U.S. based cloud computing providers).
130. Kuner, supra note 128, at 13.
131. See G.A. Res. 68/167 (Jan. 21, 2014); High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to
Privacy in the Digital Age: Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, at 6,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014).
132. See Wolfgang Ewer & Tobias Thienel, Völker-, unions- und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte des
NSA-Datenskandals, 2014 NJW 30, 32; Markus Kotzur, Datenschutz als Menschenrecht?, 2013
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 216, 218; see also Ilina Georgieva, The Right to Privacy under Fire –
Foreign Surveillance under the NSA and the GCHQ and Its Compatibility with Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 8
ECHR, 31 Utrecht J. Int’l & Europ. L. 104, 124 (2015).
133. On the general issue of extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, see MARKO
MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES
AND POLICY 7–9 (2011).
134. Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age,
56 HARV. INT. L.J. 81, 102–08 (2015); see also Beth Van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now Is the Time for Change, 90 INT’L L.
STUD. 20, 22–34 (2014).
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flexible. The European Convention of Human Rights, which is framed in
different terms than the ICCPR, has been applied by the ECtHR and the
Commission of Human Rights in cases of extraterritorial violations of human
135
rights. To avoid irrational or unfeasible results, the ECtHR has limited the
obligation of the member states to respect the rights guaranteed by the
Convention to two main situations: First, the spatial model, which is the de
136
facto effective control over an area; and second, the personal jurisdiction
137
model, or the exercise of authority and control over an individual. If such
jurisdictional criteria are satisfied, then a state in question may be answerable
even for extraterritorial violations.
The ECtHR’s approach to extraterritoriality has been developed mainly
regarding cases concerning the infringement of the right to life, liberty, and
138
personal integrity. Applying it to interferences with privacy is a difficult task,
largely because such interferences are typically incorporeal and do not require
the exercise of physical powers over the person. To gain traction over the issue,
it is useful to distinguish, following a suggestion by Marko Milanovic, among
three different factual scenarios: (1) The surveillance is carried out on the
state’s own territory and the target is located inside the national borders; (2) the
surveillance is carried out, or the resulting data are processed, on the state’s
139
own territory but the target is located abroad; and (3) the person is located
abroad and the interference with privacy takes place outside the state’s own
territory. Under the ECtHR’s spatial model of jurisdiction, one could argue that
140
both the first and second scenarios justify the application of the Convention.
The third situation is more problematic because it is not covered by the
spatial model, and even under the personal model, it is not clear whether the
interception of communications or the bulk collection of metadata would
qualify as an exercise of “authority or control” over an individual. Milanovic
has recently argued that the right to privacy under the ECHR should be applied
extraterritorially in this third situation as well, noting that it would be irrational
to treat differently factual situations that involve the same set of substantive

135. See generally Milanovic, supra note 134; THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS § 1.4.3.M (Pieter Van Dijk et al. eds., 2006).
136. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
137. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, para. 137 (2011). The
Court stated:
It is clear that, whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an
individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to
that individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to
the situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided
and tailored.”
Id.
138. See generally Milanovic, supra note 134, at 37–48.
139. For a similar case, see Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173
(2006).
140. See Milanovic, supra note 134, at 60.
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problems. The interferences with privacy under the Section 702 program,
however, do not appear to trigger this more complex scenario but rather seem
to fall under the second scenario, given that both PRISM collection and
142
upstream collection take place on U.S. territory. One could argue, therefore,
that if personal data of European citizens are collected and processed by the
NSA without complying with the procedural and substantive requirements of
Article 17 of the ICCPR, the overall situation would be highly asymmetrical:
American citizens would be protected by Article 8 of the European Convention
of Human Rights (with respect to surveillance carried out by European
intelligence and police authorities), whereas Europeans would not enjoy similar
guarantees vis-à-vis surveillance by U.S. authorities.
In addition to the discriminatory application of privacy rights, another novel
element of the current transatlantic dispute involves the methods that have
been used by the NSA to gather intelligence on Europeans. The first part of this
article described two official channels through which the U.S. government can
obtain personal data on Europeans—pursuant to the PNR agreement and to
the TFTP II agreement. There also exists the Mutual Legal Assistance
Agreement between the EU and United States, which makes it possible, under
certain conditions, to gather and exchange data for the prevention and
143
investigation of criminal activities, including international terrorism. In the
eyes of some European commentators, the U.S. authorities have deliberately
circumvented these official channels by collecting data directly from private
service providers, an action they claim might even amount to a violation of
international law.
C. The Lawfulness of European Surveillance
As mentioned above, according to initial reports, it appears that some of the
largest European intelligence agencies, including those of England, France, and
Germany, have actively cooperated with the NSA and have collected and
probably exchanged large amounts of personal data on European citizens,
including many who have never been the object of a counterterrorism or
144
criminal investigation. This has revealed the rift, discussed earlier in the
context of PNR and TFTP II, between different European actors. Although
data-protection authorities and certain liberal political parties have championed
145
privacy rights, they have always met with powerful resistance from the forces

141. Id. at 60–61.
142. See generally BOWDEN, supra note 94, at 13–24.
143. See Letter from EU Vice-President Viviane Reding to U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, at 2
(June 10, 2013), http://edri.org/files/holder.pdf.
144. For a detailed overview, see generally NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE,
supra note 101.
145. See, e.g., Working Document, supra note 104; Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 04/2014 on
Surveillance of Electronic Communications for Intelligence and National Security Purposes (Apr. 10
2014)
[hereinafter
Opinion
04],
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp215_en.pdf.
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of law and order, and in particular, the national security establishment. The
allegations of mass data collection and processing by European intelligence
services also raise the question of whether a gap exists between the law on the
books and the actual operation of state activities: Have the principles of
European data-protection law been violated? Various complaints have already
146
been lodged both before national and supranational courts, but even at this
early stage it is possible to clarify some general points.
At the outset, it should be noted that the legal framework governing the
various intelligence programs is highly fragmented. As a policy area, national
security falls outside the competences of the EU and is reserved for the member
147
states.
The laws regulating the powers, internal organization, and
responsibilities of intelligence and security agencies, as well as oversight
148
mechanisms, tend to vary significantly among different European countries.
Notwithstanding this diversity, a number of general principles can be
derived from the European constitutional framework and from the harmonized
European law of data protection. Because the European Convention on Human
Rights governs all the activities of European states, including national security
surveillance, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is the most clearly applicable
body of law. As explained earlier, the right to privacy under Article 8 of the
Convention is triggered whenever public or private bodies gather information
that can be associated with a person. For processing to be lawful, there must be
a basis in law, a clearly defined purpose set down in that law, and
proportionality. The Court has adapted these general requirements to the
specific context of surveillance by national intelligence services in what, by now,
constitutes a fairly substantial line of jurisprudence.
149
First, in the 1978 case of Klass and Others v. Germany, the Court held that
any person whose communications are likely being monitored under a secret
intelligence program, even if it cannot be shown that he or she was actually a
150
victim of surveillance, has standing to sue. In other words, an application is
146. The ECtHR has affirmed the admissibility of the case Big Brother Watch v. U.K., App. No.
58170/13 (2013); see also Liberty v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
UKIPTrib 13_77-H (2015) (declaring the regime that governs the sharing between Britain and the
United States of electronic communications intercepted in bulk was unlawful for breach of Art. 8
ECtHR prior to the disclosures made during the court proceedings). Also particularly relevant is the
recent decision of the CJEU, Grand Chamber, is Case 362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection
Commissioner (2015), discussed below.
147. Treaty on European Union Art. 4(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326); see also Opinion 04,
supra note 145, at 6–7.
148. See DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF
SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011). A complete legal
analysis, therefore, would require proceeding jurisdiction by jurisdiction, something which would
exceed the scope of this article.
149. Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978).
150. Id. §§ 34–38 (laying down the principle according to which “an individual may, under certain
conditions, claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures or
of legislation permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures were in fact
applied to him. The relevant conditions are to be determined in each case according to the Convention
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considered admissible even in the absence of concrete evidence of harm. As the
Court observed in Weber and Saravia v. Germany:
[T]he mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of
communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation
may be applied. This threat necessarily strikes at freedom of communication between
users of the telecommunications services, and thereby amounts to an interference with
the exercise of the applicants’ rights under Article 8, irrespective of any measures
actually taken against them.151

This relatively permissive test for obtaining standing contrasts with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s position, affirmed in Clapper, that the mere threat of
152
surveillance does not establish standing.
Once the Court finds that the surveillance in question amounts to an
interference with the right to privacy under Article 8, it examines whether the
interference is provided for by the law and is necessary in a democratic society to
153
achieve the aims mentioned in Article 8(2) of the Convention. Roughly
speaking, “provided for by law” maps onto the legal basis and purpose
requirements discussed in the first part of this article, whereas “necessary in a
democratic society” tracks this article’s proportionality analysis.
In the context of intelligence operations, the Court has repeatedly stated
that the “law” authorizing secret surveillance programs must “be accessible to
the person concerned, who must, moreover, be able to foresee its consequences
154
for him, and compatible with the rule of law.” To understand the Court’s
jurisprudence, it is useful to reproduce in full the following passage on
foreseeability, applicable both to the interception of individual communications
and to mass electronic surveillance programs:
[F]oreseeability in the special context of secret measures of surveillance, such as the
interception of communications, cannot mean that an individual should be able to
foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can
adapt his conduct accordingly . . . [h]owever, especially where a power vested in the
executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident . . . [i]t is
therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on interception of telephone
conversations, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming
more sophisticated . . . . The domestic law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give
citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on
which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures . . . . [T]he law
must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities
and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate
protection against arbitrary interference. In its case-law on secret measures of
surveillance, the Court has developed the following minimum safeguards that should
be set out in statute law in order to avoid abuses of power: the nature of the offences
which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories of people
liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the

right or rights alleged to have been infringed, the secret character of the measures objected to, and the
connection between the applicant and those measures”).
151. Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 78 (2006) [hereinafter Weber
Decision] (emphasis added).
152. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
153. Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 80.
154. Id.§ 84.
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procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the
precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the
circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.155

Applying this jurisprudence on the “law” required to authorize the
interference with the privacy right, the ECtHR held against the United
156
Kingdom in Liberty v. The United Kingdom. The Strasbourg Court found that
the 1985 Act authorizing the interception of communications passing between
the United Kingdom and an external receiver violated Article 8 for the
following three reasons: (1) There was no limit on the type of external
communications that could be included in a warrant; (2) the Act allowed the
State authorities broad discretion on the question of which communications, out
of the total volume of those physically captured, would be read or listened to;
and ( 3) the procedures to be followed in selecting specific communications for
examination, sharing, storing, and destroying were not set out in a manner
157
accessible to the public. A similar conclusion was reached in the subsequent
158
case of Iordachi v. Moldova.
Moving to the second part of the inquiry—whether the interference is
necessary in a democratic society—the Strasbourg Court has repeatedly
affirmed that secret surveillance measures, although seriously interfering with
the right to respect of private life, may be considered admissible insofar as they
159
are aimed at protecting national security. The member states, however, are
not allowed unlimited discretion in designing such programs: “in view of the
risk that a system of secret surveillance for the protection of national security
may undermine or even destroy democracy under the cloak of defending it,”
governments are required to put in place “adequate and effective guarantees
160
against abuse.”
With this requirement, the Court imposes a classic
proportionality test, which must take into consideration “all the circumstances
of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures; the
grounds required for ordering them; the authorities competent to authorize,
carry out and supervise them; and the kind of remedy provided by the national
161
law.”
To illustrate the application of these principles, in the case of Weber and
Others v. Germany, the ECtHR came to the conclusion that the German
program that permitted the wiretapping of international telephone calls for
purposes of counterterrorism, the so-called G-10 Act, as modified by the Fight
162
against Crime Act of 28 October 1994, satisfied both of Article 8’s

155. Id. §§ 93–95 (emphasis added)
156. Liberty v. U.K., App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 64–70 (2008).
157. Id. §§ 64–69.
158. Iordachi v. Moldova, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
159. Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 106; see also Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Eur. Ct.
H.R. § 49 (1978).
160. Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 106.
161. Id.
162. Act of 13 August 1968 on Restrictions on the Secrecy of Mail, Post and Telecommunications
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requirements of “law” and being “necessary in a democratic society.” The law
defined in a clear and precise manner the offenses that could give rise to an
interception order, the duration of the interception, the categories of persons
likely to be intercepted, the maximum duration of monitoring measures, the
procedure to be followed for examining and using the data, and the
163
circumstances in which recordings could be erased or tapes destroyed.
An analysis of TEMPORA, one of the most intrusive and sophisticated of
the national security programs revealed by Snowden, sheds light on how these
principles might be applied to mass surveillance. There are two primary
components to the program. First, it appears that the GCHQ has been allowed
to access, in secret and without controls, the personal data pertaining to U.K.
164
citizens gathered by the NSA under the Section 702 program. If this is
confirmed, then such an activity would amount to a circumvention of the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which requires the government to
adopt specified safeguards when intercepting communications of individuals
located in the United Kingdom. Without a detailed and accessible legal basis,
165
and in the absence of any “adequate and effective guarantee against abuse,” it
is difficult to see how such an interference with private life could be considered
legitimate by the Strasbourg Court. Second, it has been reported that the
GCHQ has intercepted more than 200 fiber optic cables landing in the United
Kingdom, storing and extracting data related to “external communications” of
primarily non-U.K. citizens. The intercepted communications include both the
content and metadata of telephone calls and internet traffic, such as e-mails,
Facebook entries, and Google searches. Although authorized under certificated
warrants issued pursuant to section 8(4) of the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000, this surveillance seems to be disproportionate insofar as the
bulk interception of communications on a continuous and indiscriminate basis
comprises blanket surveillance of thousands and possibly of millions of
166
people. Additionally, U.S. officials have allegedly been granted extensive
167
access to this data, again in the absence of a clear and transparent legal basis.
Will the European courts rule against the mass surveillance programs

(Gesetz_zur Beschränkung des_Brief-, Post- und_Fernmeldegeheimnisses), as modified by the Fight
against Crime Act of 28 October 1994 (Verbrechensbekämpfungsgesetz); see Matthias Bäcker, Das G 10
und die Kompetenzordnung, 2011 DÖV 840.
163. Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 92.
164. NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101, at 53, 55.
165. Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 106.
166. TEMPORA was challenged before the U.K. Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The Tribunal
held in favor of one of the claimants (an Egyptian nongovernmental organization), on the basis of a
breach of Article 8 of the ECHR, in light of the exceedingly long time of retention of the intercepted
data. See Liberty v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UKIPTrib 13_77-H
(2015) As regards the other claimants, the Tribunal held that the sharing of information between the
U.S. and Britain in the frame of the PRISM and TEMPORA programs was in breach of Art. 8 ECHR,
because the domestic law was not sufficiently transparent and accessible to the public, prior to the
disclosures made during the court proceedings. Id.
167. NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101, at 55.
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carried out by several national agencies, allegedly in collaboration with the
NSA? Although it is hard to tell at the moment, some indications suggest that
they might. In 2013, the ECtHR, following a preliminary examination of its
admissibility, decided to give priority, under rule 41, to the application lodged
by Big Brother Watch and Others (a coalition of nongovernmental organizations
engaged with the protection of privacy and other civil liberties) against the
168
United Kingdom. The applicants have complained that the TEMPORA
program, analyzed above, has no adequate basis in domestic law and is not
169
proportionate under Article 8 of the Convention.
The CJEU has also recently taken a more categorical approach to privacy.
Since the Snowden revelations, the Court has decided three important dataprotection cases: Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister of Communications Ireland
170
and others, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and
171
172
Mario Costeja González, and Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner. All
bear witness to the Court’s hardening stance on the right to personal data
protection. The judgments also demonstrate considerable attention to the
extraterritorial dimension of the policy problem and the challenges of
safeguarding the right in the face of market and government surveillance that
occurs within other jurisidictions, particularly the United States. And lurking in
the background, or in the case of Schrems, squarely on the face of the judgment,
is the deeply troubling policy problem that has been brought to the fore by the
Snowden revelations: How can privacy be protected in the face of
unprecedented advances in digital technologies, the growing concentration of
power and personal data in the hands of market actors, and the seemingly
unlimited appetite for that data among law enforcement, national security, and
173
other government actors?
On April 8, 2014, in Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU found that
174
Directive 2006/24/EC was invalid. The so-called Data Retention Directive
required electronic communication providers to collect and retain all traffic and
location data of all their clients concerning fixed telephony, mobile telephony,
Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet telephony for a period between six
months and two years. These metadata were to be made available “for the
175
purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime.” The

168. Big Brother Watch v. U.K., App. No. 58170/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013).
169. The complaint is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents
/libe/dv/bbw_org_ep_ck_v_uk_/bbw_org_ep_ck_v_uk_en.pdf.
170. Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communic’s, Marine and Natural
Res., 2014 E.C.R (2014).
171. Case-131/12 (2014) (not yet reported).
172. Case-362/14 (2015) (not yet reported).
173. On the underlying social and technological context and its transformation, see Fred H. Cate et
al., Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 195 (2012);
Richards, supra note 119, at 1936–41.
174. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., supra note 169.
175. Id. at § 16.
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CJEU found the Directive incompatible with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which respectively enshrine the
right to privacy and the right to personal data protection.
In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU reasoned that the interference with
privacy was particularly serious because of the huge quantity and type of data
involved, together with the fact that the data were retained and subsequently
used without any knowledge of the data subject. In the view of the CJEU, the
data-retention requirement was “likely to generate in the minds of the persons
concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant
176
surveillance.” In the judgment, the CJEU acknowledged that the objectives of
the Directive were of the utmost importance, being related to the fight against
177
organized crime and terrorism but found that the interference with privacy
was not proportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued. To reach this
conclusion, the Court assigned particular relevance to the following elements:
(1) The data retention program applied to all persons without limitations, and
even to persons “for whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting that their
conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one, with serious crime;”
(2) the program covered all data, irrespective of any relationship between such
data and a threat to public security; (3) the Directive set down no substantive
and procedural conditions to regulate access to and use of the data by the
competent national authorities; (4) such access was not made dependent “on a
prior review carried out by a court or by an independent administrative body
whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly
necessary;” and (5) the retention period was fixed in general terms, between six
months and two years, without a distinction being made among the different
types of data and without employing criteria designed to guarantee that the
retention period be limited to what was strictly necessary in light of the aims
178
pursued.
The CJEU also pointed to another flaw in the Data Retention Directive: it
did not prohibit the retention of the metadata outside of the EU,
with the result that it cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article
8(3) of the Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with the requirements
of protection and security, as referred to in the two previous paragraphs, is fully
ensured. Such a control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential component
179
of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.

The danger alluded to—transferring data to less privacy-protective
jurisdictions—could be very well be interpreted as a specific reference to NSA
surveillance.
Only one month after Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU handed down its
judgment in Google Spain. There the CJEU found Google liable for violating

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. § 37.
Id. § 51.
Id. §§ 51–68.
Id. § 68.

BIGNAMI & RESTA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2015]

1/8/2016 2:38 PM

TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY REGULATION

263
180

the so-called right-to-be-forgotten in the EU Data Protection Directive. That
right is linked to the right of individual access and correction, discussed earlier
in this article, and requires that firms like Google expunge from their computer
systems personal information that fails to comply with data-protection
standards such as accuracy and proportionality. In a critical part of the
judgment, the Court found in favor of broad territorial application of the EU
Directive to ensure that European data-protection rights could not be
181
circumvented by processing personal data outside the EU. Even though
Google argued that the EU Directive was not applicable because all the data
processing connected with its search engine occurred in the the United States,
the CJEU found that a corporate presence in the EU for purposes of selling
advertising space was enough to bring Google within the territorial scope of the
Directive.
The last in this trilogy of data-protection cases is Schrems v. Data
Protection Commissioner. In the wake of the NSA scandal, an Austrian citizen
and subscriber of Facebook, Maximilian Schrems, lodged a complaint before
the Irish Data Protection Commissioner. He claimed that Facebook Ireland
systematically transferred the data of its European customers to Facebook
USA’s servers in the United States, where they were stored. Facebook was a
participant in the Safe Harbor program and therefore, as explained earlier in
this article, was entitled to a finding of adequacy for purposes of satisfying the
requirements of the EU Data Protection Directive on data transfers to third
countries. Schrems, however, relied on the Snowden revelations of Facebook’s
involvement in the PRISM program (which allows the NSA access to the data
of EU citizens held by Internet companies) to argue that the transfers violated
the substantive and procedural guarantees of the Directive and the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Articles 7 and 8). When the Data Protection
Commissioner refused to take action, Schrems challenged the Commissioner’s
decision in Irish court, which in turn referred the issue to the CJEU.
The CJEU held in favor of Schrems, against Safe Harbor. Although the
judgment touches on a number of issues, the most important one for purposes
of this article is the question of whether adherence to the Safe Harbor
principles guarantees the adequacy of data protection for European data
transferred to the United States. The Court’s answer was a resounding “No.”
The Court faulted the Safe Harbor agreement and the accompanying
Commission decision on adequacy for including a broad exception for U.S.
government access to personal data based on “national security, public interest,
or law enforcement requirements” or based on “statute, government regulation,
182
or case-law.” In assessing adequacy, the Commission had focused exclusively
on the private sector and had failed to assess whether the legal standards
180. Case-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (2014) (not yet
reported).
181. Id. § 54.
182. Id. §§ 84–87
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applicable to government actors were comparable to those under EU data183
protection law.
After pointing out these flaws in the Commission’s decision, the Court
set down the criteria that would have to be satisfied for the United States to be
considered an adequate jurisdiction. These criteria are grounded on the legal
basis and purpose, as well as proportionality, requirements that have been
central to this area of constitutional law since the early 1970s and that have
already been discussed in the context of the German Constitutional Court and
the ECtHR. The Court found that indiscriminate access to electronic data, in
particular the content of communications, would violate the essence of the right
to privacy. Any law serving as the basis for a interference with the right to
privacy would have to include “objective criterion . . . to determine the limits of
the access of the public authorities to the data, and of its subsequent use, for
purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable of justifying the
184
interference.” In addition, the right of access, correction, and in some cases,
185
erasure, would have to be enforceable through the courts. Since the
Commission made no such findings, the Court held that the Safe Harbor
adequacy determination was invalid.
IV
CONCLUSION
The revelations of NSA surveillance are but the last, albeit perhaps the most
dramatic, episode in transatlantic privacy regulation. Whatever one might think
of the NSA programs, they have undoubtedly had repercussions for privacy and
transatlantic relations more broadly speaking. In July 2013, the European
Parliament passed a Resolution calling for an official investigation into the NSA
programs and instructed its Parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties,
186
Justice, and Home Affairs to conduct an in-depth inquiry into the matter.
After six months of intense activity, on January 8, 2014, the Rapporteur Claude
Moraes published a Draft Report that called for a Parliament Resolution
condemning the programs of indiscriminate surveillance of citizens and
proposing a complex package of reforms aimed at improving privacy
187
safeguards. The Report, approved by the European Parliament on March 12,

183. Id. §§ 88–90.
184. Id. § 93.
185. Id. § 95.
186. Resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security Agency Surveillance Program,
Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Privacy, 2013/2682
(RSP) (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-20130322&language=EN.
187. All the relevant documents are collected in LIBE COMMITTEE INQUIRY, ELECTRONIC MASS
SURVEILLANCE OF EU CITIZENS: PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN A DIGITAL AGE (2013–
2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201410/20141016ATT91322/20141016ATT9132
2EN.pdf.
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2014, demonstrates the climate of distrust created by the NSA programs. This
climate has compromised some of the arduous efforts of the past decades to
overcome regulatory differences and create a harmonized privacy scheme to
facilitate transatlantic trade and to improve cooperation on security and law
enforcement. The Parliament Report called for immediate suspension of Safe
Harbor and, as discussed above, a year later, the Court of Justice invalidated
the Commission decision granting “adequate” data-protection status to those
U.S. firms that subscribe to the Safe Harbor principles. Even earlier, in October
2013, the Parliament passed a resolution advocating suspension of TFTP II.
There have also been consequences for transatlantic trade relations more
broadly speaking. The 2014 Parliament Report called for the suspension of the
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement
until the conclusion of negotiations on a transatlantic “Umbrella Agreement”
setting down data-protection guarantees for personal information exchanged
188
for law enforcement purposes. Although Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership Agreement negotiations have gone forward, there is currently a
significant push to also conclude the Umbrella Agreement, without which it is
unlikely that the European Parliament will ratify any trade deal at all. One of
the biggest hurdles to finalizing and ratifying the Umbrella Agreement is the
double standard for U.S. citizens and EU citizens in U.S. law, a double standard
that has been particularly evident in the operation of the Section 702 program.
It would be misleading to portray the European reaction to the Snowden
leaks as unequivocally hostile. The member states and their governments,
individually and through the Council of Ministers, have been fairly silent.
Moreover, there have been numerous attempts by interior ministers and their
supporters to enhance EU-wide surveillance in the interest of fighting the threat
of extremism and terrorism. For instance, the President of the European
Council, Donald Tusk, has recently urged the European Parliament to pass a
longstanding proposal for an EU PNR that would mimic the system in place in
189
the United States.
What can be said, however, is that the vigorous
transatlantic debate on privacy can contribute to protecting both sides from
complacency. There is no doubt that personal data processing can produce,
both in the market and the surveillance contexts, significant benefits. There is
also no question that robust privacy guarantees are necessary and the
transatlantic debate has had a positive impact on privacy. As with many policy
issues, the debate on privacy is somewhat lopsided and the regulatory actors
most directly impacted can sometimes use the ebb and flow of public attention
190
to avoid institutional reform. As public outrage over the Snowden affair fades
188. Draft Report on the US NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member
States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in
Justice and Home Affairs (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-526.085+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN.
189. Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, Address to the European Parliament,
Strasbourg (Jan. 13, 2015).
190. For the theory of how salience cycles can be used strategically by institutional actors to delay
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and government and corporate actors seek to strategically delay—and perhaps
avoid—legal change, the existence of a symbolic set of fundamental rights and a
vocal set of watchdogs in Europe can help sustain attention to the policy
problem and keep privacy reform on the public agenda.

or prevent change, see GIOVANNI CAPOCCIA, WHEN DO INSTITUTIONS BITE? HISTORICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2012) (unpublished typescript)
(on file with the University of Oxford).

